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INTRODUCTION
unng 1994, the California Law Re-
vision Commission asked this au-
thor to report on the standing and
jurisdictional problems of California's
Unfair Competition Act. That report, is-
sued mid-January, presents eight pro-
posed amendments to this statute. These
proposals are now under consideration by
the Commission. The report, entitled
California's Unfair Competition Act:
Confusions and Conundrums, intersects
with the jurisdictions of California's reg-
ulatory agencies. This article discusses the
critique of the report in relation to regula-
tory agencies, which have additional and
coextensive authority over unfair compe-
tition within their respective jurisdictions.
California's Unfair Competition Act,
Business and Professions Code section
17200 et seq., prohibits "any unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business act or prac-
tice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or mis-
leading advertising...... 1 Such unfair com-
petition is unlawful as to any person "who
engages, has engaged, or proposes to en-
gage" in it 2 The statute's breadth is matched
by its liberal and perhaps unique standing
provisions. The Attorney General, 58 of-
fices of district attorney, plus offices of
county counsel and city attorneys in hun-
dreds of cities (where authorized by the
local district attorney) may bring an action
for injunctive relief and civil penalties
under the Act. Moreover, any private party
may bring an action for injunctive relief
acting "for the interests of itself, its mem-
bers or the general public."3
The general mandate of the law to po-
lice "unfair" or "unlawful" competition
also covers much of the jurisdiction of
California's regulatory agencies. Many
regulatory statutes prohibit enumerated
business practices as "unfair" or "unlaw-
ful." Administrative agencies adopt reg-
ulations to clarify and flesh out often
broad enabling act directives. The viola-
tion of these rules is considered "unfair"
in most cases, and "unlawful" univer-
sally. Hence, the violation of the statu-
tory provisions enforced by an agency,
or its own rules, gives rise to an action
under Business and Professions Code
section 17200 which may be brought by
a myriad of public prosecutors, and by
any person representing himself or the
general public. The statute accordingly
bootstraps its own remedies onto what-
ever remedies the agency may have to en-
force its enabling act and its own adopted
regulations.
While coextensive access to the courts
from a variety of sources is not unusual,
several factors have coalesced to cause
confusion given this law's unusual li-
cense for plaintiff representation of the
general public. One such factor is an in-
crease in cases where alleged business
overcharges may give rise to substantial
restitution to the public (either directly
or through fluid recovery or cy pres re-
lief). That equitable remedy is part of the
injunctive relief available to all plaintiffs
under the Act. Another factor has been
the substantial attorneys' fees available
to plaintiff's counsel in cases creating a
beneficial fund or vindicating interests
beyond the named plaintiff.
Private plaintiffs representing "the
general public" pose a particular diffi-
culty under Unfair Competition Act
terms. These plaintiffs need not meet the
extensive requirements of state or federal
class action procedure, e.g., certification
as a class with demonstrated common
questions and adequacy of representa-
tion, notice, manageability, a showing of
superiority of the class mechanism to re-
solve the dispute, et al. Rather, the Act
provides that any person who files is a
party allowed to represent the injunc-
tive/restitutionary interests of all who
may be injured-historically or prospec-
tively. If the litigation which then ensues
bars others who might have been victims
and are due restitution, serious due pro-
cess issues arise. That is, many "unfair
competition" cases are brought by plain-
tiffs based on their own narrow dispute
with a defendant; their allegations of
public injury warranting restitution be-
yond their individual interest may ex-
pand discovery scope and increase lever-
age-a leverage they may sacrifice for
their own gain. Although such plaintiffs
may not be faithful to the "general pub-
lic" interests they purportedly represent,
the statute imposes no requirement that
they "adequately represent" them, nor
does it even prohibit direct conflicts of
interest. For example, nothing in the stat-
ute prohibits a confederate of a corpora-
tion engaged in unfair competition from
suing on behalf of "the general public"
and reaching a stipulated judgment de-
claring an otherwise unfair or unlawful
practice to be legal. The only check on
such an abuse is the possible denial of
res judicata4 effect to the outcome, al-
lowing others to sue.
From the perspective of regulatory
agencies, private actions on behalf of all
consumers (allegedly represented by the
agency as well) may conflict with an on-
going agency investigation leading to-
ward serious administrative discipline of
licensed professionals, including possi-
ble revocation of the right to practice.
The court is likely not to know of the
agency's interest, and the agency may
well not know of the private lawsuit. In-
deed, many lawsuits are simultaneously
filed and settled by stipulation. Although
a class action would require that the
plaintiff adequately represent the class
and also require public notice of a set-
tlement, the Unfair Competition Act in-
cludes no such requirement. This means
that the agency is not in a position to
influence, or even comment on, the pro-
posed settlement. And if given res judi-
cata effect, the private action may un-
dercut its enforcement effort in progress.
In fact, if such a result binds the agency,
the defendant would be foolish not to
stimulate such lawsuits, pay substantial
attorneys' fees, and obtain an "arranged"
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court judgment sanctifying the practice
the agency is about to challenge.
Nor is this problem confined to the
relationship between agencies and pri-
vate parties. Even public prosecutors can
be a problem where conflicting public
plaintiffs proliferate. For example, in
People v. Hy-Lond Enterprises, Inc.,5 a
district attorney in a rural county col-
lected $40,000 in civil penalties for his
county treasury and no restitution for
victims in a section 17200 case. The de-
fendant was a nursing home with facili-
ties in eleven other counties which re-
ceived no compensation and whose vic-
tims received no restitution. The Depart-
ment of Health Services (DHS) was in
the midst of a disciplinary investigation
against the defendant at the time the case
was settled. Sure enough, the defendant
held out the settled superior court judg-
ment as stare decisis to bar the Attorney
General, any other district attorney, or
DHS from bringing a subsequent action.
The judgment instructed that it was a
final resolution of the violations alleged.
As are all district attorney filings, the ac-
tion was brought on behalf of and in the
name of "The People of the State of Cal-
ifornia." To top it off, the judgment pro-
vided that the local district attorney was
"the exclusive governmental agency that
may enforce the provisions of this in-
junction." 6
The Hy-Lond court acknowledged the
nursing home's argument that "in order
to avoid confusion, parties dealing with
the state must be able to negotiate with
confidence with the agent authorized to
bring the suit, and without the fear that
another agency or other state entity might
overturn any agreement reached...[,] to
avoid being caught in the midst of a power
struggle amon, various state agencies and
other entities." But the court held that
where the defendant deliberately manip-
ulates a district attorney into concessions
to "limit the powers of other state agents
or entities, which he knows are involved
and are not parties to the action, the
[above] argument does not survive scru-
tiny."8
Currently, regulatory agencies are au-
thorized by section 17200 to request that
a public prosecutor to file an action
against a licensee under the statute, but
they lack the power to file such an action
themselves. Moreover, they will not be
notified in the normal course about an
investigation or filing by a public pros-
ecutor (or private litigant). And many
cases, particularly those filed by public
prosecutors, are investigated pursuant to
the prefiling discovery powers available
to the Attorney General and district at-
tomeys, 9 and are filed and settled by
stipulation at the same time.
Notwithstanding the problems attend-
ing the multiple parties able to bring ac-
tions under the Unfair Competition Act,
their resolution by denial of res judicata
effect invokes a separate and similarly
distressing set of difficulties. A blanket
denial of finality affects not only the hy-
pothetical co-conspirator of the defendant,
but a bona fide public interest attorney or
perhaps a public prosecutor, and under cur-
rent law would apply whether the case is
coordinated with affected agencies or not,
and whether it originates with them or not.
The denial of resjudicata status means that
no plaintiff can offer finality to a defen-
dant, and no defendant can be assured of
securing it. In fact, the concern of the Hy-
Lond court was well-placed.10 Defendants,
who understandably need finality, may be
frustrated by duplicate filings, uncertain
exposure, and legal fees to litigate identical
issues against different plaintiffs, none able
to offer a universally binding resolution.
11
The coextensivity permitted in Hy-Lond
may save DHS' action against that nursing
home facility, but it is a Pyrrhic victory
even as to the agency. For the coextensivity
turns both ways: It means that if DHS had
initiated an action through referral to the
Attorney General, coordinated its settle-
ment, and arrived at a final resolution it
thought was fair to all concerned, it would
not be dispositive. Whatever it does, the re-
spondent would remain vulnerable to a civil
suit for additional or different injunctive
terms by a private party, or by multiple pri-
vate parties in different fora, all representing
"the general public." And if the agency in-
stead opted for the administrative discipline
of its licensee, the same unfair or unlawful
acts giving rise to its remedy could then be
relitigated by private or public plaintiffs se-
riatint
From the defendant's perspective, life
resembles Bosnia. Anyone may attack
for any reason and it appears that nobody
can negotiate-not only are there fac-
tions, but it is unclear who has authority
to bind anyone to peace or a final reso-
lution. In fact, a public settlement of any
disciplinary adjudication by an agency
may create a relatively easy follow-on
suit by one of the other actors. This "pil-
ing on" problem is not merely a diffi-
culty for a defendant-a defendant has
dubious reason to settle with an entity
enforcing a statute where it is unable to
end the matter. This concern is not the-
oretical; major settlements (described
infra) are currently stymied by this di-
lemma.
Notwithstanding the "too many cooks"
problem, there are benefits to having more
than one entity able to enforce unfair
competition law. As discussed below,
public prosecutors, private plaintiffs, and
agencies each have serious disadvan-
tages as exclusive enforcers of fair and
lawful competition. The challenge is to
rationalize the interaction of these dispa-
rate progenitors, prioritize or allocate the
authority of each, provide for notice and
participation meeting due process stan-
dards, preclude conflicts of interest, and
confer important finality to the result.
The goal should be that of any dispute
resolution system: a consistent, consid-
ered, and certain result. The needed fi-
nality requires sufficient due process
quality to bind those not direct parties to
the litigation. The statute needs a traffic
cop.
THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY
OF SECTION 17200
California's "unfair competition" stat-
ute originated as part of the state's Civil
Code in 1872.12 In its early form, it sim-
ply prohibited "unfair" practices in com-
petition. The law was initially used as an
exception to the traditional admonition
that "equity will not enjoin a public of-
fense," and to allow a statutory basis for
many of the traditional "business torts,"
such as commercial disparagement, trade
secret theft, trade name infringement, et
al.13 Over the past century, the statute
has evolved through amendment and de-
veloping caselaw, both influenced by the
existence of a similarly worded federal
statute-the Federal Trade Commission
Act, enacted in 1914.14
Much of the early caselaw interpre-
ting the statute occurred while the law
was located at section 3369 of the Civil
Code. In 1977, the law was moved to
section 17200 et seq. of the Business and
Professions Code, a move not intended
to alter it substantively nor to affect the
applicability of pre-existing interpretive
caselaw. 15 The law is now sandwiched
between the similarly titled "Unfair Prac-
tices Act" beginning at section 17000
(which is roughly analogous to the fed-
eral Clayton Act and prohibits below
cost predation and price discrimination
offenses) and section 17500, which pro-
hibits deceptive advertising.
16
As the Unfair Competition Act evolved,
it became far more than a vehicle for
business tort remedy between disputing
commercial entities. Rather, it became a
means to vindicate consumer or public
market abuses by business entities in a
variety of contexts, and to preserve gen-
eral marketplace fairness and legality.
Major alterations of the statute substan-
tively over the past several decades in
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that direction include the following:
- an amendment which prohibits "un-
lawful" as well as "unfair" competition;
17
- caselaw broadly applying the statute
to a wide variety of alleged unlawful
18
or unfair business jTractices, 19 including
restraints of trade,2U sale of endangered
whale meat, 2 1 purveying obscene mate-
rial,2 2 mobile home park regulation vio-
lations,2 3 abuse of the legal process,
24
nursing home abuses, 2 5 and many oth-
ers; and
- coverage to include practices origi-
nating from out-of-state but affecting
California consumers.
26
Perhaps more significant, numerous
structural/procedural changes have been
engrafted upon the statute over the years
to create a mix of remedies and addi-
tional actors able to apply them, includ-
ing the following:
* the addition of a "civil penalty" of
$2,500 per violation available to the At-
torney General and the state's district at-
torneys for violations;
27
- additional civil penalties of $2,500
per violation where the victim is a senior
citizen or is disabled;
2 8
- the inclusion of an enhanced civil
penalty of $6,000 per violation where
there is an intentional violation of an
outstanding injunction under the Act;29
. interpretation of separate "viola-
tions" which can be multiplied times the
maximum penalty of $2,500 (or $6,000)
based on the number of victims affected
by them;
30
* prefiling discovery powers available
to public prosecutors;
- expansion of the public offices able
to bring actions to include certain offices
of city attorney,3 2 and then further ex-
pansion in 1991 to include-where the
county district attorney consents-any
county counsel enforcing a county ordi-
nance, or any full-time city attorney;
3 3
- injunctive relief broadly defined to
include restitution under equitable prin-
ciples, and an injunction based on "past
actions" even if no current violations are
occurring; 34 and
- as noted above, liberal standing to
bring actions for injunctive relief and
which allows "any person" to sue for
himself or for "the general public," 35 and
such standing may be assumed by one
who is not himself or herself a victim of
the practice complained of.3
6
And the statute makes clear that its
remedies are cumulative of other reme-
dies provided for in specific statutes, in-
cluding those laws which prohibit busi-
ness acts as "unlawful," crimes, torts,
and regulatory offenses in the normal
course.
3 7
COMPARISON TO SECTION 5 OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT
Although called California's "Little
FTC Act," the unfair competition statute
takes a very different enforcement ap-
proach from its federal counterpart, sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. The federal section 5 is roughly
comparable in its substantive and generic
prohibition of "unfair or deceptive acts"
in competition. 38 And federal caselaw
has interpreted section 5 broadly to in-
clude restraints of trade and a wide va-
riety of unfair business practices and
types of misleading advertising.3 9 The
substantive breadth of the federal "un-
fair" prohibition, recognizing the variety
and imagination of entrepreneurs, is
analogous to state unfair competition
statutes. State courts, including Califor-
nia's, generally hold federal cases to be
"more than ordinarily persuasive" in in-
terpreting state counterparts.40 One
premise of the federal statute is to ad-
dress unfair business practices which
might confer a competitive advantage
leading others to reciprocate. The result-
ing downward spiral (the "lowest com-
mon denominator" problem discussed
infra) is a common concern of federal
law and the "Little FTC Acts" in the states.
However, the federal statute has a
very different enforcement regime than
do fifteen of the sixteen states with "Lit-
tle FTC Acts." The Federal Trade Com-
mission directly and exclusively enforces
the federal Act.41 The FTC's traditional
remedy has been the filing of an admin-
istrative complaint, proceedings, and the
entry of a "cease and desist order" against
a person or entity committing unfair acts
in competition. Where contested, such an
order may be appealed by the respondent
in federal court. The advantage to a sin-
gle administrative agency adjudicating
such orders rests with the notice and pro-
spective clarity it may afford actors in a
marketplace. Where addressing a con-
cept as nebulous as "deceptive advertis-
ing," for example, knowing with some
certainty the lines between permissible
puffery and unlawfully misleading ad-
vertising theoretically may be assisted by
a system of advance guidance and warn-
ing.
However, prior to the 1970s, the only
punitive sanction possible against a vio-
lator was a $5,000-per-day civil pen-
alty-assessed only against those who
violated a preexisting cease and desist
order. One study calculated that it took
the FTC, on average, 4.17 years to final-
ize a contested cease and desist order.
42
Since most ad campaigns run for less than
one year, the efficacy of the agency's most
severe sanction was problematical. In
fact, from the perspective of the rational
advertiser, it would pay to gain market
advantage through deception until and
unless a cease and desist order were en-
tered. Literally, no sanction from the
agency (aside from possible adverse
publicity) could be forthcoming until
such an order were in place. Hence,
some critics contended that the scheme
was quite literally a license to mislead,
or a system of assured "free bites."
4 3
The FTC Act has been amended pro-
cedurally periodically over the past twenty
years, with major changes in the 1970s
and 1980s allowing the FTC to serve an
established cease and desist order on an
entity other than the entity against whom
it was entered and to assess civil penal-
ties if it is violated, and to assess direct
civil penalties where a properly adopted
and more general "trade regulation rule"
was in place when the act complained of
occurred. Notwithstanding these adjust-
ments, unless such an order or rule ap-
plies to a practice (and existing orders
and rules cover a minuscule portion of
potentially violative business practices),
there remains no deterrent-producing
sanction. Only if a specific practice is
already subject to one of the enumerated
orders or rules prohibiting it may a mon-
etary sanction be imposed under the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act.
State "Little FTC Acts," including
California's, generally use a different ap-
proach. They allow an immediate sanc-
tion to be imposed without warning, ac-
complishing a theoretically deterrent-
producing disincentive to engage in "un-
fair" or "unlawful" acts in competition.
They generally allow certain public agen-
cies, and sometimes private parties, to as-
sess a punitive damage, treble damage,
or civil penalty sanction.
The use of a multitude of sources to
bring to the courts possible violations
carries with it some clear enforcement
advantages. Early detection and action,
and more likely response, are important
elements in an effective system of disin-
centives. However, there are some costs
which can attend a system of multitudi-
nous and coextensive response, e.g., lack
of advance knowledge except through
the relatively expensive process of liti-
gation, possible multiple representation
of similar interests, possible confusion
and conflicts in adjudications, and pos-
sible estoppel or foreclosure based on
prior suits by those who did not and
could not adequately represent the inter-
ests purportedly involved. As discussed
California Regulatory Law Reporter - Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter 1995)
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infra, these costs of the Unfair Compe-
tition Act's current format in California,
which is substantially different than the





Sixteen other states have statutes most
directly comparable to California's Unfair
Competition Act: Alaska,44 Connecti-




Montana,52 Nebraska,53 North Caro-
lina,54 South Carolina,5 5 Utah, 56 Ver-
mont,57 Washington, 58 and Wisconsin.
59
To summarize their features, most use
the broad language of the Federal Trade
Commission Act and specifically give
FTC decisions at least "guidance" status.
Most allow actions at law to recover
damages (a broader concept than the in-
junction/restitution allowed by Califor-
nia), and most also allow either punitive
or treble damages. But plaintiffs must
suffer actual business or personal injury.
And where class actions are allowed,
only a qualified plaintiff is permitted to
file for others similarly situated, and
must in every case meet some or all of
the traditional requirements of class ac-
tion certification (including, in particu-
lar, adequate representation of and notice
to absent class members). Some of the stat-
utes spell out these safeguards, 6° while
most provide them as part of their generic
class action civil procedures. Most allow
public civil actions by a state attorney gen-
eral or other official, and tend to include
injunctive, forfeiture of corporate rights,
and civil penalty relief.
61
None of the sixteen other state juris-
dictions with versions close to Califor-
nia's Unfair Competition Act gives pri-
vate attorney general status to any person
without qualification. Rather, persons
must be injured to obtain redress for
themselves, and must undertake a variety
of different steps if they are to represent
others who are similarly situated. These
steps assure adequacy of representation
and res judicata finality, and inhibit a
multiplicity of remedies for the same al-
leged offense.
Exacerbating the problem for Califor-
nia defendants are several additional fea-
tures which distinguish the California legal
environment from the other sixteen states
with unfair competition acts. None of the
other states has the population, wealth,
economic variety, or active plaintiff and
local public prosecutor bars of Califor-
nia.62 None, except perhaps Illinois and
Florida, approaches the scale or con-
plexity of California's business and legal
economy. None appears to have a com-
parable volume of pled unfair competi-
tion causes of action.63 California also
has the possibility of attorneys' fees
under the common fund doctrine or
under Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5. Ironically, the structure of sec-
tion 1021.5 favors attorneys' fees for
counsel representing interests without
any appreciable financial stake in the
matter adjudicated, since it is the vindi-
cation of rights substantially beyond
those of the client which gives rise to
fee recompense, including the possibility





Before outlining the current problems
besetting the unusual structure of Califor-
nia's Unfair Competition Act, it is prudent
to review the fundamental purposes it is
intended to serve. By keeping those pur-
poses in mind, alterations to cure real or




One basic common purpose to the
federal and counterpart state FTC Acts
is to address the "lowest common de-
nominator" problem of certain types of
abusive competitive business practices.
That is, many unfair or unlawful acts by
a given competitor may confer on the
offender a competitive advantage. Such
a competitive advantage may require
other competitors to respond with more
extensive abuse in order to preserve mar-
ket share, which in turn leads the initia-
tor to further abuse. Unless a counter-
force is imposed from the marketplace
or some public source, certain types of
business behavior may spiral naturally
down to a lowest common denominator.
One common area of such abuse in-
volves what economists call "informa-
tion imperfections," consumer prosecu-
tors term "deceptive or misleading ad-
vertising," and the average citizen calls
"lying." For some products or services,
such as those requiring repeat business
and where the consumer can judge per-
formance, misleading representations
may be assuaged through the market-
place alone. But where massive advertis-
ing campaigns can be mounted for one-
time depredations, there may not be a
traditional marketplace response capable
of adequate remedy.
In extreme cases, criminal sanctions
may well suffice. But beyond criminally
enforced standards at the mens rea end
of the spectrum, a great deal of clearly
inaccurate information about products
and services may cause consumer pur-
chases contrary to actual consumer pref-
erence-which betrays the consumer
sovereignty standard of a free and effec-
tive marketplace. Moreover, tolerance up
to the point of extreme cases invoking
criminal intervention tends to lead to a
bending of the truth by competitors, and
the counterstroke exaggeration or mate-
rial omission by the original offender,
leading to further information degrada- I
tion. Perhaps an extreme example of use-
less information may be found in the one
forum where there are no standards or
public intervention: political advertising.
One end result of the degeneration of
accurate information about products is a
loss in credibility suffered by all adver-
tisers. One public price paid is a barrier
to entry to one who has, in fact, a prod-
uct or service many would greatly de-
sire-if they could believe claims made
about it. The story we are all told about
as youngsters of the boy who cried "wolf'
may apply to cause us to discount all ad-
vertising to such an extent that it loses
much of its informational value. To be
sure, the state is ill-equipped to be an
arbiter and enforcer of absolute truth in
advertising, but the other end of the
spectrum involves a momentous price;
where a society tolerates misleading
claims as a matter of course, truthful
messages may not be heard.
ALTERNATIVES TO PRIVATE
OR PUBLIC LITIGATION
There may be significant counterforces
to competitive degradation from mislead-
ing advertising or to the many other vari-
eties of unfair or unlawful competition, in-
cluding consumer education and gradual
decline in demand, private civil suits by
competitors, possible consumer class ac-
tion response in some circumstances,
criminal prosecutions, or regulatory in-
tervention. However, each of these
mechanisms has serious limitations.
Consumer education may not be feasible
or forthcoming. Competitors may choose
to join the practice rather than adhere to
higher standards-knowing that a private
remedy may involve protracted and ex-
pensive litigation during which the initi-
ator continues to gain market advantage.
Consumer class actions must surmount
the considerable class certification and
notice barriers-and in the context of un-
certain attorneys' fees; moreover, fees
(and incentives to litigate) depend on re-
coverable damages-after they have oc-
curred. The criminal option may be lim-
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ited to defined categories of fraud or
similar extreme offenses.
The Case for Agency Jurisdiction
Theoretically, societal response to
many kinds of market flaws ideally
comes from regulatory agencies. Their
raison d'etre is to address external costs,
anticompetitive practices, or other mar-
ket flaws. Currently, civil litigation is
used as a primary means of assessing the
damages from external costs, both to
provide a disincentive and to recom-
pense victims. However, its effectiveness
is dubious on both counts. According to
the Harvard Medical Practice Study, the
largest examination to date of medical
negligence and resulting incidence of lit-
igation remedy, "eight times as many pa-
tients suffered an injury from [medical]
negligence as filed a malpractice claim
in New York State. About 16 times as
many patients suffered an injury from
negligence as received compensation
from the tort liability system." 65 The
I study included a review of hospital re-
cords covering thousands of cases by a
panel of experts. The panel adjudged fa-I cial negligence resulting in various lev-
els of injury and correlated these errors
with subsequent litigation. The results
indicate some of the problems in relying
on private civil suit to provide systemic
compensation. It is costly, delay-ridden,
and arbitrary-providing compensation
and a disincentive only in a small frac-
tion of cases.
Similar conclusions may apply to un-
fair or unlawful acts in competition. Ar-
guably, even a lesser percentage become
the subject of court action. However,
there is one distinguishing factor. Unlike
individual acts of negligence, most un-
fair competition practices are replicated
en masse to a broad public. A suit theo-
retically vindicates all of the small griev-
ances occurring or prospective in one
case. In that sense, a private Unfair Com-
. petition Act action is more akin to a mass
tort case or other class action, taking ad-
vantage of significant economies of scale
in resolving a dispute.
However, even with the grouping of
many transactions into a single case, a
regulatory remedy may have other ad-
vantages: Mass tort or other class actions
involve millions of dollars in legal fees
and many years of delay, and tackling
health or environmental abuses may be
difficult for private parties lacking exper-
tise to bring or finance. An agency is
likely to specialize in the subject matter
at hand, with in-house experts. Finally,
an agency is better able to anticipate
harm, and to inquire effectively prior to
any civil filing. An agency may even act
in advance of an abuse, preventing it
through rulemaking, barriers to entry, or
other regulatory tactics. It can theoreti-
cally alter practices industry-wide and
quickly, using a mix of quasi-legislative
and adjudicative powers.
The legislature has structured the Un-
fair Competition Act for substantial, in-
deed excessive, coextensivity. However,
the courts find the doctrines of exhaus-
tion of remedies and primary jurisdic-
tion, et al., attractive. Where given the
chance, or occasionally fabricating their
own opportunity, courts are sympathetic
to agency jurisdiction.66 In Farmers In-
surance Exchange v. Superior Court,
67
the California Supreme Court erected a
novel state "primary jurisdiction" bar to
an unfair competition action under sec-
tion 17200.68 In Samura v. Kaiser Foun-
dation Health Plan,69 a court held that
the Knox-Keene Health Care Service
Plan Act regulating health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) limited substan-
tially any action under the Unfair Com-
petition Act. 70
The Problem of Reliance
on Agencies
The theoretical advantages of agency
jurisdiction listed above, although persua-
sive in some courts, have not been actual-
ized empirically. As discussed below, one
countervailing factor is the alleged "cap-
ture" of regulatory agencies by those
with a profit stake in their policies. To
the extent this contention has merit, it
commends rejection of reliance on agen-
cies as an exclusive remedy for unfair
competition.
In general, regulation involves an
agency being asked to intervene on be-
half of the broad body politic to address
a serious market flaw. But its activities
are of practical concern to those with a
profit stake in its decisions; and those
interests are increasingly organized hor-
izontally (e.g., by trade or profession). 71
In fact, many regulatory agencies are
governed, from curious statutory require-
ment, by boards or commissions com-
posed in majority of persons from the
trade or profession regulated. 72 Of those
with a majority of public members, the
professional members tend to control the
agency's decisionmaking. And in most
cases, an acculturation process occurs
because those with a narrow interest in
the agency's policies are able to domi-
nate agency advocacy, information dis-
semination, and even related social events.
The effect of such domination may not al-
ways be apparent from minutes of meet-
ings-the problem is most often not
what agencies do, as what they do not
do.
Those serving on agency governing
boards who are part of the profession or
trade regulated, or those advocating for
a trade or industry before an agency, do
not often promote readily apparent pub-
lic harm. Many agency boards are made
up of volunteers who are personally eth-
ical and well-intentioned. They seek to
raise the standards of their trade or pro-
fession. And, likely as not, they judge
more harshly than most the flagrant dep-
redations of their peers. Indeed, the out-
casts among them may receive greater
discipline than is recommended by the
administrative law judge in an enforce-
ment proceeding.
The problem with control of occupa-
tional licensing agencies by those with a
profit stake interest in the agency's
decisionmaking is not with consciously
self-serving intentions, or with lack of
indignation over those within the "tribe"
who defraud or injure. The problem is in
the almost universal failure to address
the tribal rules themselves, even where
unfair in their impact on others. The most
egregious problems for many trades and
businesses subject to Unfair Competition
Act enforcement are rarely on the agen-
das of relevant regulatory agencies. In
order to gauge the incidence of what is
inherently not examined, one may survey
the unfair competition cases which-al-
though arguably within the jurisdiction
of a regulatory agency-are brought by
more neutral public prosecutors or by
private counsel. A few examples indicate
the extent of agency unreliability as a
sole repository of enforcement:
- Virtually every licensed real estate
broker belongs to a private association
of "realtors" which controls multiple list-
ing services (listings of all properties
available for sale in an area-the effec-
tive marketplace for practitioners). In
1978, trade association members in San
Diego openly combined to use the MLS
system to sanction a licensee who charged
a commission price different than the 6%-
of-sale-price commission followed slav-
ishly by the rest. Although the trade as-
sociation of licensees openly arranged for
the joint sanction of the independent
pricer, the Real Estate Commissioner did
not act.
In a related and broader offense extend-
ing throughout the state, the same realtor
trade associations arranged for group boy-
cotts and unlawful tie-ins. For example,
they required all licensed agents who used
the MLS marketplace they controlled to
use only "exclusive listings" (homeowners
wanting to sell their homes were required
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to choose one broker and give him an
exclusive right to sell the property). And
the associations required all agents wish-
ing access to the MLS marketplace to
purchase it, and to separately pay for po-
litical lobbying and campaign contribu-
tions of the association as a precondition
to access-which was necessary to prac-
tice the profession. Although these prac-
tices were widespread and open, the Real
Estate Commissioner did nothing while
the offense continued for over a decade.
Finally, a public prosecutor filed an ac-
tion under the Unfair Competition Act to
end all three practices.
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- Beginning in the 1970s, banks and
savings and loans began a series of clas-
sic unfair business practices. For exam-
ple, they set up "impound accounts" ap-
plicable to consumers with real estate loans
with positive balances to pay taxes and in-
surance-without the consent of the ac-
countholder and collecting the interest on
positive balances for themselves. Other li-
censed institutions charged outlandish
sums for bounced checks, although they
suffered little damage as the checks were
not honored. Others imposed late pay-
ments in violation of state law pertaining
to liquidated damages. And so on. Some
of these abuses continue, but at no time
has the Superintendent of Banking or any
other applicable regulator intervened. In-
stead, remedy came from private plaintiff
cases, using-inter alia-the Unfair Com-
petition Act.
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- At this writing, several independent
certified shorthand reporters (CSRs) are
challenging the practice of "direct con-
tracting," an exclusive dealing arrange-
ment whereby an association of CSRs con-
tracts with a major consumer of reporter
services, such as an insurance company,
for the exclusive right to report depositions
taken by attorneys representing that con-
sumer. The independent CSRs allege that
"direct contracting," at least as practiced
by the defendant CSRs and insurance com-
panies, compromises the impartiality of the
defendant CSRs, provides them with a fi-
nancial -interest in the outcome of the liti-
gation, and constitutes an unreasonable re-
straint of trade.75 Although regulation of
this practice clearly falls within the juris-
diction of the Department of Consumer
Affairs' Court Reporters Board, the Board
has taken no action to prohibit the practice
or even require its disclosure.
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The examples of agency failure to at-
tack prevalent abuses proliferate through-
out the pages of 50 issues of the California
Regulatory Law Reporter over the past fif-
teen years. In a recent year, the Medical
Board revoked the licenses of only 27 phy-
sicians (almost all for criminal felony of-
fenses or in response to discipline by other
states), while in that same year over 700
suffered civil malpractice judgments or set-
tlements in excess of $30,000 and 249 lost
their admitting privileges at hospitals due
to incompetence or impairment.7 7 The body
of law known as "insurance bad faith" in-
volves, essentially, unfair competition alle-
gations against insurance firms which re-
fuse to pay valid claims. During the same
twenty-year period in which literally hun-
dreds of such cases were brought and won,
the Insurance Commissioner initiated pub-
lic discipline against no regulated licen-
see.78 In 1988, the California Supreme
Court rejected a third-party claimant's
right to sue an insurance firm for bad
faith; the court cited the jurisdiction of
the Insurance Commissioner as the appro-
priate vehicle to enforce unfair competition
standards, ignoring the dissent which
pointed out that-notwithstanding coex-
tensive jurisdiction to at least discipline li-
censees-no such enforcement had ever
occurred against a single licensee.
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The depth of the problem is usually
indicated by a comparison of the interest
of most occupational licensing agencies
in barriers to entry into a trade and in
stopping "unlicensed practice," versus their
records in disciplining serious abuse by li-
censed practitioners. -SO
Although the theoretical advantages of
agency response to many competitive
abuses are undeniable, until there is a clear
demarcation between these agencies and
the interests being regulated, and until
other reforms are undertaken, they are not
worthy of substantial reliance standing
alone. Ideally, until such reforms are ac-
complished, they are best made aware of
what others are doing in subject areas rel-
evant to their jurisdiction. And their exper-
tise may be useful to counsel and courts
in the course of Unfair Competition Act
litigation. The task is to provide those ben-
efits without allowing agencies to block or
delay court adjudication of serious busi-
ness abuses.
A STATUTE FOR MANY
INITIATORS-BROAD
BUT SHALLOW
The notion of an "unfair competition"
statute to superimpose over existing mech-
anisms is philosophically based on the fol-
lowing premises:
- many business practices, not ame-
nable to specific description or defini-
tion, impose external costs on others,
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endanger effective marketplace prerequi-
sites, or risk irreparable harm;
- a substantial number of these prac-
tices confer a competitive advantage to
those engaged in them; and
- other available remedies do not ac-
complish the disgorgement of unjust en-
richment from unfair or unlawful prac-
tices, and do not otherwise provide an
effective deterrent to their continuation
and likely replication by others.
Hence, the characteristics of the stat-
ute reflecting its contextual purpose in-
clude:
- a statute wide in substantive scope,
encompassing any "unfair" or "unlaw-
ful" practice which may be characterized
as a "business" practice or act;
- an action "lying in equity" for ex-
peditious decision, and allowing the
court flexibility in fashioning remedies,
including restitutionary relief to disgorge
unlawfully obtained moneys; and
- de minimis standing requirements
for private litigants, combined with in-
junctive or corrective remedies, and civil
penalties reserved to certain public agen-
cies.
This broad charter to address judicially
unfair acts in competition is ameliorated in
the Act by limited remedies, creating-in
essence-a broad but shallow scheme of
relief. The idea is as follows: A lot of actors
can sue, so the courts will get the cases.
But excessive, spurious, and duplicative
cases will not be generated because the
remedies are substantially prospective, and
there is no (or uncertain) allowance for




From 1972 (when the leading Barquis83
case ushered in the broad application of
section 17200) until the late 1980s, there
had been little conflict between the many
potential litigants able to invoke the terms
of the statute. Public prosecutors in some
of the larger counties have used section
17200 consistently over the years.84 But
common use of the remedy did not
spread to small or rural counties. Further,
district attorneys and the Attorney Gen-
eral have now entered into an arrange-
ment to coordinate such filings, begin-
ning with initial investigations. The At-
torney General maintains a computer file
in which offices of district attorney "reg-
ister" the name of any prospective de-
fendant under investigation for section
17200 offenses. Hence, district attorneys
are put on notice of possible action by
another public jurisdiction, and the At-
torney General is able to monitor inves-
tigations and filings in order to intervene
if needed. The status of the Attorney
General in this regard as the "chief law
enforcement officer of the state" allows
that office to intervene and to assume ju-
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risdiction over any filing by a district at-
torney where there is a conflict warrant-
ing it.
However, the unusual standing li-
cense of the Unfair Competition Act, and
the lack of class action qualification, cer-
tification, and notice requirements, now
combine to create public/private and pri-
vate/private civil action conflicts given
two recent developments.
The first change has been the increas-
ing use of section 17200 as a general al-
legation in complaints. The use of the
Act as a cause of action facilitates broad
discovery. Moreover, where applicable to
a private dispute between two business
entities, it may allow the plaintiff to cre-
ate possible exposure from overcharges
applicable to consumers, enhancing a
preexisting plaintiff's bargaining power.
At the same time, such "add-on" use of
the Act by private plaintiffs raises seri-
ous due process questions; one using an
allegation for bargaining purposes may
be willing to settle out those claims in
order to collect on a proprietary cause of
action. 85 On the other hand, if settle-
ments by those seeking to represent "the
general public" under the statute do not
bind any other person, then the statute is
unable to assure finality to any defendant
subject to suit. Both of the above alter-
natives are unacceptable features in any
statutory remedy.
The second new development has been
an increase in attorney fee availability
and in attorneys (and professional plain-
tiff firms) specializing in mass tort or
class action cases. Where injunctive re-
lief may involve restitution (a common
element to an injunctive remedy), and
where a practice is applied en masse to
a large marketplace (also common),
attorneys' fees may be available for pre-
vailing counsel. Moreover, Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.5 allows for "pri-
vate attorney general" attorneys' fees
where a litigant prevails and vindicates
rights which extend substantially beyond
his or her own proprietary stake. And
those fees may involve a "multiplier"
substantially enhancing market level bill-
ing.86
To recapitulate, the combination of
the following features of the Unfair
Competition Act and related events have
created actual and potential confusion:
1. The breadth of the Act allows its
inclusion as a cause of action in many
business and consumer civil actions (pri-
vate and public) brought on other bases.
It may be invoked for any business prac-
tice which is unlawful or unfair, and it
facilitates liberal discovery and enhanced
leverage for plaintiffs.
2. Fifty-eight county district attor-
neys, five city attorneys, and the State
Attorney General may bring an action
for injunction and for civil penalties-a
portion of the latter accruing to the gen-
eral fund of the jurisdiction filing.
3. As of 1992, and with the consent
of the district attorney, any full-time city
attorney may bring an action for injunc-
tion and civil penalties under section
17200 (California has over 400 cities);
and a county counsel may similarly sue
for section 17200 injunction and civil
penalties for violations of county ordi-
nances.
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4. Regulatory agencies with possible
subject matter expertise, jurisdiction, and
their own enforcement plans may not be
informed of a pending public (or private)
case while under investigation, and per-
haps not until after filed and settled.
5. Private parties may also file suit;
critically, the Act allows any person to
bring an action for injunctive relief, "act-
ing in the interests of itself, its members
or the general public."
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6. Injunctive relief, available to all of
the potential plaintiffs enumerated above,
encompasses "such orders or judgments,
including the appointment of a receiver,
as may be necessary to prevent...unfair
competition,...or as may be necessary to
restore to any person in interest any money
or property, real or personal, which may
have been acquired by means of such un-
fair competition."
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7. The private standing conferral to
vindicate unfair practices for "the gen-
eral public" is akin to "private attorney
general" status and does not require the
numerosity, commonality, adequacy, typ-
icality, manageability, or other require-
ments of class actions under California
Code of Civil Procedure section 382 or
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; nor
does it require formal certification or no-
tice to those affected.
8. Where damages have accrued be-
cause of overcharges or where restitution
otherwise may involve a substantial fund
of moneys in dispute, the case may ad-
judicate a dispute comparable in sub-
stance to a standard class action, 90 with
attendant problems of collateral estoppel,
duplication, adequacy of representation,
and due process notice and opt-out re-
quirements.
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9. Where there is a common fund, or
where a large benefit has been conferred
on a large number of persons other than
the named plaintiff, attorneys' fees may
be available; whether from a common
fund or as "private attorney general"
under Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5, such an award may be substan-
tially more than the fair market value of
services proffered. 92
10. Restitution to large numbers of
persons overcharged a small sum each is
often impractical via direct delivery of
checks, and is accomplished through
"fluid recovery" (where future prices are
lowered for the same group allegedly
overcharged), or through cy pres relief
(where a fund is established to disgorge
unjust gain and is granted for charitable
purposes to generally benefit the persons
injured). 93 Hence, potential victims (mem-
bers of the public being "represented" by
a party plaintiff) may not be aware that
they have benefitted. Notwithstanding
the payment of substantial restitution, a
defendant may not be able to bar further
suit by victims, even those who are the
beneficiaries of such restitution.
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The confluence of these factors poses
a serious dilemma for public prosecutors
and bona fide public interest attorneys
attempting to resolve unfair competition
cases; they cannot confer assured final-
ity. And the dilemma is particularly frus-
trating for defendants who are unable to
end a dispute they are willing to resolve.
In addition to the Hy-Lond case de-
scribed in the introduction, the following
examples highlight the real dilemmas of
the current statute:
- A private party files a section 17200
case against a pyramid sales scheme on
behalf of all victims; the local district at-
torney files a similar case and it settles
first-taking all of the assets of the de-
fendant as civil penalties (half of which
go to the county general fund); none are
assigned for restitution. The private ac-
tion cannot compel intervention or con-
solidation in the public civil action to en-
sure a coordinated resolution.
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- A county district attorney investi-
gates a local cable company for exces-
sive late charges by serving prefiling sub-
poenas, consulting experts, and arriving at
a prefiling settlement after an eighteen-
month investigation which will give res-
titution amounting to the entire alleged
overcharge, including both direct pay-
ments to subscribers and a requirement
to provide cy pres relief in the form of
direct interactive wiring of all class-
rooms within the service area for educa-
tional enhancement. In addition to com-
plete restitution, the final judgment pro-
vides for substantial civil penalties, plus
costs. One week before the filing of the
district attorney's complaint and settle-
ment, a plaintiff firm which had learned
of the investigation filed a section 17200
action for the same practices against the
same defendant. The defendant had been
assured by the district attorney that full
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restitution would preclude a private ac-
tion on behalf of persons already satis-
fied, and the defendant believed the dis-
trict attorney. However, the defendant's
demurrer to the private action was over-
ruled by a superior court judge, opining
that the public and private civil actions
are different because the former is not
"in privily" with the consumer victims, and
hence there is no resjudicata effect.96 The
district attorney, although joined by the
Attorney General in the action and ne-
gotiating a case providing for penalties
and complete restitution, is unable to
provide a final resolution.
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- In the investigation and settlement
described above, the same cable com-
pany was sued again by another private
plaintiff in yet another action for the
same alleged excessive late charges.
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- A plaintiff files a meritorious unfair
competition case against a mobile home
park; the defendant countersues, also al-
leging violation of section 17200 against
the plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel (pri-
marily for violation of the State Bar Act
for allegedly "soliciting" plaintiff as un-
fair competition). Both plaintiff and de-
fendant sue for themselves and the gen-
eral public. The defendant may be will-
ing to settle if the case is a wash, i.e., the
plaintiff contends that the section 17200
countersuit is a "SLAPP"-type of action
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designed to discourage the plaintiff, and
the defendant has no affirmative motiva-
tion to prosecute. If the plaintiff gives up
his claims, the defendant may well agree
to settle the case, perhaps by straight dis-
missal, perhaps with token remedies in-
tended to bind others. Can such a coun-
tersuit be brought by a defendant on behalf
of the general public? Is such an advocate
an adequate representative of the interests
he purports to represent? Should the re-
sult be res judicata as to others?100
The law is unclear as to when an ac-
tion by a public or private litigant pur-
porting to represent all consumers has
res judicata effect. 10 1 But as discussed
above, there are unacceptable problems
whether it is given effect, or whether it
is not. If the action does bar others from
an identical suit, there is no mechanism
to assure that the remedy legitimately
satisfies the claims at issue or represents
the "general public" interests being liti-
gated. But if it is not res judicata, then
the defendant is subject to an unlimited
number of lawsuits from future litigants
over the same alleged practice.
The current arrangement of "let ev-
eryone in" without criteria or limitation
does not provide a structure for finality.
The perceived lack of finality by defen-
dants leads them to eschew settlements
they would otherwise accept. And if fi-
nality were to be granted under current
procedures, it might be based on which
plaintiff reaches the courthouse door first,
or (more likely) on who the defendant set-
tles with first, which effectively gives the
selection of who represents '"he general
public" to the defendant-not the ideal
party to make such a decision.
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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The areas of confusion in current Un-
fair Competition Act procedure involve
the coextensive jurisdictional conflicts of
public prosecutors versus private plaintiffs
versus private defendants versus public
agencies in all combinations. But it is pos-
sible to draw from other statutes and pro-
cedures in a way allowing us to maintain
the benefit of multiple access to the
courts without the confusion, duplica-
tion, and possible abuse of process
harms now occurring. Several alterations
in procedure may accomplish substantial
reform: ordering priorities in representa-
tion of the general public, requiring no-
tice where appropriate, and interposing
just those elements of class action law
representation necessary to inhibit the
use of the Unfair Competition Act for
collateral and improper advantage.
Accordingly, we propose the follow-
ing amendments to the current Unfair
Competition Act, as follows:
(1) Section 17204.1 is added to the
Business and Professions Code as fol-
lows:
Where an action is brought on behalf
of "the general public" pursuant to sec-
tion 17204, injunctive judgments or or-
ders resulting therefrom shall be res ju-
dicata as to the issues litigated against
named defendants where:
(a) the plaintiff separately pleads a
cause of action for unfair or unlawful com-
petition "on behalf of the general public";
(b) the pleading is submitted to the
district attorney of the county in which
it is to be filed, and to the state attorney
general, at least 60 days prior to court
filing, during which time either office
may notify the plaintiff of its intention to
file a case covering substantially similar
alleged acts of unfair competition. If ei-
ther office so notifies the plaintiff:
(1) the plaintiff shall not file the
action unless neither notified public of-
fice files such an action within a one
year period of plaintiff's notice, in which
case the plaintiff may proceed;
(2) where either notified public of-
fice files such an action, the plaintiff
shall submit to it an itemized cost bill
including all out-of-pocket costs and all
attorneys 'fees reasonably incurred in in-
vestigating the case and in preparing ini-
tial pleadings;
(A) the cost bill shall only in-
clude those costs and fees directly attrib-
utable to the representation of the gen-
eral public;
(B) the cost bill shall not in-
clude a multiplier for attorney hours;
and
(C) the cost bill shall be sub-
mitted by the public office filing the case
to the court for an appropriate award
from the defendant(s) as a part of any
resulting final judgment other than dis-
missal;
(c) counsel for the plaintiff must be
an "adequate legal representative" of
the interests of the general public pled;
(d) no plaintiff may have a conflict of
interest precluding the good faith repre-
sentation of the interests of the general
public claimed;
(e) prior to the entry of final judg-
ment, notice of the proposed terms, in-
cluding all stipulations and associated
agreements between the parties, is pro-
vided to:
(1) the district attorney in the
county where the action is filed;
(2) the state attorney general;
(3) regulatory agencies with juris-
diction over the subject matter of the dis-
pute or any of the parties allegedly act-
ing within the scope of regulated prac-
tice; and
(4) the general public through
newspaper publication, or such other
form of notice as specified by the court;
(f) prior to entry of final judgment,
there is a hearing thereon, with oppor-
tunity for all persons responding to the
notice of proposed entry to object or oth-
erwise be heard, and to remove them-
selves from collateral estoppel coverage;
and
(g) there is no expansion of the scope
of the original applicable complaint, or
of the final judgment from that com-
plaint, unless the court affirmatively
finds that such alteration does not prej-
udice members of the general public to
be bound by the judgment.
Explanation: As argued above, cur-
rent law allows any person to sue on be-
half of "the general public," without con-
ferring finality as to any such suit. It al-
lows any person to serve as a de jure
private attorney general with no qualifi-
cations. If finality were to be conferred
in such a setting, it would bind absent
victims to a result without opportunity
to be heard, in violation of due process
rights. The proposed amendments alter
the law to confer finality with conflict
of interest and due process safeguards.
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This amendment applies only to those
cases where a private plaintiff is not lit-
igating a wrong as to him or her, but on
behalf of "the general public." Such con-
tentions are to be specifically pled to
make certain where they are claimed.
There must be advance notice to public
prosecutors and, as an inherently supe-
rior class representative of the general
public, they may pick up the case.
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This precludes further private action if
there is a subsequent public filing; out-
of-pocket costs and reasonable fees may
be recovered should the public prosecu-
tor prevail.
However, most cases will not be as-
sumed by a public prosecutor given lim-
ited resources and increasing burdens
from "three strikes" and other related
criminal justice system changes. Accord-
ingly, private counsel clearing public
prosecutor notice must be an adequate
representative of the general public he or
she claims to represent, and the named
plaintiff must not have a conflict of in-
terest vis-a-vis the members of the gen-
eral public to compromise the fiduciary
duty of counsel between the named
plaintiff and the general public. These
barriers are substantially more surmount-
able than the full gamut of traditional class
action requirements (many of which do
not apply to a section 17200 case). Fi-
nally, there must be notice to affected
persons and a hearing to allow for opt
out and for consideration of the fairness
of the proposed judgment.
And that hearing must involve notice
to any agency with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or any of the parties to
the action to allow intervention, amicus
curiae participation, or other appearance.
Agencies themselves are not given au-
thority to bring actions since they are not
general prosecutorial entities and are al-
ready specifically empowered to request
filings by the Attorney General under sec-
tion 17206(c) and to receive investiga-
tive cost recompense from defendants
under section 17207(d).
If the preceding due process stan-
dards are met, then a case brought by a
private party on behalf of "the general
public" may constitutionally and equita-
bly be entitled to res judicata effect.
(2) Section 17204.2 is added to the
Business and Professions Code as fol-
lows:
(a) Actions brought by the public of-
ficials specified in section 17204 shall
be res judicata as to issues litigated
against named defendants. However,
said public officials may limit the collat-
eral estoppel effect to allow a private
cause of action to determine the appli-
cation or nature of a particular remedy,
including restitution.
(b) Where a final judgment in an ac-
tion by the public officials specified in
section 17204 includes a provision for
restitution to alleged victims, it shall col-
laterally estop all such persons or others
on their behalf from litigating the same
issues against the named defendants,
where a public plaintiff complies with
sections 17204.1(e)(2), (e)(3), and (J).
Explanation: Public prosecutors are
clearly entitled to collaterally estop others
from litigating the same issues they have
litigated against named defendants. How-
ever, where restitution is sought which will
bind and preclude victims from private re-
dress, due process requires that there be
minimal notice and opportunity to be
heard. For example, if a single victim lost
$100,000 as a result of a violation of the
Unfair Competition Act and the restitution-
ary system proposed by the public prose-
cutor provides for a pro rata payment of
$4 to every person in a group of alleged
victims, there should be an opportunity for
such a person to be heard and perhaps sep-
arately treated prior to entry of a final judg-
ment which may preclude his or her ex-
traordinary relief.
(3) Section 17204.5 of the Business
and Professions Code is repealed, and
replaced with the following new sec-
tion 17204.5:
(a) Any city attorney or county coun-
sel authorized to bring actions under this
chapter pursuant to section 17206(a)
shall inform the district attorney of its
county of any unfair competition inves-
tigation formally undertaken at the ear-
liest practicable time. If a complaint is
filed by an authorized city attorney or
county counsel which includes an alle-
gation pursuant to this chapter copies
shall be forwarded at time of filing to
the district attorney of the county and to
the attorney general, respectively.
(b) The attorney general shall keep a
registry of cases currently being investi-
gated and pleadings filed by public offi-
cials, and by private parties alleging
representation of the general public,
under this chapter. The registry of the
attorney general shall be used to coor-
dinate possible conflicts between local
jurisdictions where alleged violations ex-
tend substantially outside the county
where the matter is being investigated or
brought.
Explanation: Existing section 17204.5,
which permits the San Jose City Attor-
ney (with the permission of the Santa
Clara County District Attorney) to bring
section 17200 actions, has been rendered
obsolete by recent amendments to sec-
tion 17206(a), and can be repealed. The
proposed new language simply requires
notice of actions brought by public pros-
ecutors to ensure coordination of cases
where multiple cases against the same
defendants for the same violations may
occur.
(4) Conform Business and Profes-
sions Code section 17535 to the above
amendments. Because section 17535 of
the Business and Professions Code in-
cludes provisions similar to the broad
standing license of the Unfair Competi-
tion Act, similar amendments should be
enacted applicable to it as well. Section
17500 et seq. covers the broad category
of misleading advertising; section 17535
similarly allows the same wide array of
public prosecutors to file for injunctive
and civil penalty relief, and allows pri-
vate parties to sue for themselves or "the
general public" with the same lack of safe-
guards. Accordingly, sections 17535.1,
17535.2, and 17536.4 should be added cor-
responding to the three amendments pro-
posed above.
(5) An Alternative, Limited Version
Through Clarification of the Code of
Civil Procedure. A more limited version
of suggested reform is being alternatively
considered by the Law Revision Commis-
sion. The narrower approach was devel-
oped by this author following discussions
with the California District Attorneys'
Association's Consumer Protection Coun-
cil, and with the assistance of Gail
Hillebrand of Consumers Union, Deputy
Attorneys General Herschel Elkins and
Mike Botwin, San Diego prosecutors Cliff
Dobrin and Bill Newsome, discussions
within the Law Revision Commission, and
consideration of comments by private
plaintiff and defense counsel. This alterna-
tive focuses on private/public/agency inter-
action, and would amend the Code of Civil
Procedure as follows:
- Section 382.5 is added to the Code
of Civil Procedure to read as follows:
An action may be brought on behalf of
"the general public" by a private party
pursuant to sections 17204 or 17535 of the
Business and Profession Code only where:
(a) the plaintiff states that a cause of
action pursuant to section 17200 et seq.
or section 17500 et seq. is brought "on
behalf of the general public";
(b) the pleading is served on the con-
sumer department or division of the dis-
trict attorney of the county in which it is
to be filed, and on the city attorney
where filed in a city with a population
of over 750,000 persons, and on the
Consumer Law Section of the Office of
Attorney General, at least 30 days prior
to court filing, and:
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(1) said service shall include a
statement summarizing the evidence
upon which the complaint is based rele-
vant to the allegations on behalf of the
general public;
(2) proof of the service required
above shall be filed with the complaint;
and
(3) motions for preliminary relief
where relevant to "the general public"
allegations may be entertained during
the initial thirty-day period, but shall
also be served on the offices listed in (b);
(c) counsel for the plaintiff is found
by the court to be an "adequate legal
representative" of the interests of the
general public pled;
(d) the court affirmatively finds that
neither any plaintiff nor counsel for
plaintiffs has a conflict of interest which
might compromise the good faith repre-
sentation of the interests of the general
public claimed;
(e) at least 45 days prior to the entry
of final judgment, or to any modification
of a final judgment or order thereto, no-
tice of the proposed terms, including all
stipulations and associated agreements
between the parties, is provided to:
(1) the district attorney of the
county where filed and the city attorney
where filed in a city with a population
of over 750,000 persons;
(2) the state attorney general;
(3) regulatory agencies with juris-
diction over the subject matter of the dis-
pute or any of the parties allegedly act-
ing within the scope of regulated prac-
tice;
(4) the general public through
newspaper publication or such other
form of notice as specified by the court;
and
(5) any of the persons so notified
in (1) through (4) may petition the court
for an extension of time of up to thirty
days, for good cause shown.
(t) Where the conditions in (a) through
(e) above are met, the judgment shall be
res judicata as to any restitutionary or
monetary terms or orders, including
fluid recovery and cy pres methods of
monetary adjustment, contribution, or
disgorgement, where, in addition:
(1) prior to entry of final judg-
ment, there is a hearing thereon, with
opportunity for all persons responding to
the notice of proposed entry to object or
otherwise be heard, to remove them-
selves from collateral estoppel coverage,
or to protest or limit the res judicata ef-
fect of the judgment; and
(2) the complaint shall not be
amended or supplemented in a manner af-
fecting the interests of "the general pub-
lic" claimed unless the court affirma-
tively finds that such alteration does not
prejudice members of the general public
to be bound by the judgment.
- Section 382.7 is added to the Code
of Civil Procedure to read:
(a) Where there is a conflict in rem-
edies sought from the same parties based
on the same alleged acts and bases for
liability between a private action pursu-
ant to Code of Civil Procedure section
382 or an action "on behalf of the gen-
eral public" under section 17204 or sec-
tion 17535 of the Business and Profes-
sion Code, and a civil action by a public
prosecutor on behalf of the People of the
State of California under the same sec-
tions, or covering the same theories of
acts and bases for liability, the public
prosecution is entitled to preference as
the inherently superior method for rep-
resenting the interests of large classes or
of the general public within the political
jurisdiction represented. Such preference
may be determined by motion at any time
and may be based on the initial plead-
ings of actions in conflict.
(b) Judgments obtained by a public
prosecutor involving restitution or mon-
etary relief on behalf of the People of
the State of California in civil actions
pursuant to section 17200 et seq. or sec-
tion 17500 et seq. of the Business and
Professions Code are res judicata as to
the issues and parties covered thereby,
except such status:
(1) is without prejudice to cost or
attorney fee recompense by private coun-
sel who otherwise meet the criteria of
section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure; and
(2) where restitution is included in
such a judgment which purports to col-
laterally estop further restitution claims
against the named defendants by persons
who may have been damaged or other-
wise harmed:
(i) there shall be notice by
publication of the terms of such restitu-
tion, and of a public court hearing to
consider its approval, and
(ii) at or before such a hearing,
persons desiring to opt out of the
judgment's terms of injunctive or restitu-
tionary terms as applicable to them shall
have an opportunity to exclude themselves
from res judicata effect, and any person
objecting to the fairness or adequacy of
the proposed judgment shall have oppor-
tunity to comment.
(3) The court shall consider all
comments relevant to the proposed judg-
ment and may alter its terms or its res
judicata scope or effect in the interests
of justice.
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Explanation: This limited proposal
differs from the more extensive draft in
the following respects:
(1) The requirement of public coordi-
nation between the Attorney General and
ancillary public agencies is removed.
There is already an informal system in
place which accomplishes substantially
what the Attorney General "monitoring
and coordination" of district attorney fil-
ings would require. The more extensive
draft above reflects the concern that the
addition of numerous city attorneys and
county counsels as possible public filers
(upon approval of 58 respective district
attorneys within the state's counties)
complicates matters. However, thus far,
there have not been coordination prob-
lems. Accordingly, the shorter draft elim-
inates the prophylactic provision.
(2) The requirement of notice and con-
sent analogous to Proposition 65 has been
replaced with a less formal system of ad-
vance notice and designation of the public
prosecutor as the inherently superior class
representative. The previous version con-
cerned prosecutors who felt that a failure
to take over a case could have negative
political consequences, and that they did
not want the affirmative burden of judging
"yes" or "no" under a time constraint.
Plaintiffs' counsel have some problems
with having to wait one year on tenter-
hooks while the case may be litigated to
near conclusion on fast track. The revised
version satisfies some of the concerns of
both. Where a district attorney or the At-
torney General is already in the middle of
an investigation, he or she will know a
conflict is coming and can act accordingly
to head it off and to mitigate private waste
of resources. On the other hand, only a
small percentage of cases is handled on the
public side, and there is no reason to hold
private parties up, or subject them to sus-
pense. The declaration that public counsel
is inherently superior is consistent with the
view of courts. The revised structure gives
private counsel better opportunity to claim
fees based on work performed, and the
claim is strengthened the longer public
counsel waits and the more the work of
private counsel occurs or is used.
(3) The Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1021.5 attorney fee claim is filed by
the private party and not submitted through
the public attorney cost bill. Neither private
plaintiffs' counsel nor public attorneys
favor surrogate submission of the bill
through the public attorney. There is law
currently allowing private attorney general
recompense-with possible multiplier-
for litigation which contributes to a bene-
ficial outcome, even where there is a gov-
ernment co-litigator."°4
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(4) The structure is simplified, and it
has been placed in the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure as a form of class action proce-
dural instruction due to the concern of
both public and private counsel that
opening up section 17200 itself to legis-
lative change in the current climate may
invite collateral amendments and issues.
CONCLUSION
Many attorneys, both public and pri-
vate, will oppose these recommenda-
tions. They will find a myriad of objec-
tions to what we believe is a sensible
prescription. However, before allowing
the inevitable "parade of horribles" to af-
fect one's judgment, consider the "horri-
ble" now extant. No statute of which we
are aware in this state or nation confers
the kind of unbridled standing to so
many without definition, standards, no-
tice requirements, or independent review.
The substantive goal of this statute is im-
portant: It safeguards a fair and compet-
itive marketplace. It requires a workable,
rational means of enforcement. At pres-
ent, it is unclear who can sue for whom,
what they have to do, whether it is final,
and as to whom. It must be the purpose
of the judicial system to both achieve fi-
nality and to assure decisionmaking
quality warranting that finality. The cur-
rent system is, notwithstanding its bene-
ficial use by many historically, headed
toward the worst of all possible legal
worlds: abuse of process as unqualified
person disingenuously invoke the inter-
ests of the general public, extortionate
nuisance lawsuits with high exposure,
confusion and duplication of litigation
resources, and uncertain finality.
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ness or force it to similarly pollute unless
the costs of Factory A's pollution are
somehow "internalized" or added to its
respective production costs, or unless
minimum standards are imposed on all.
The means to internalize costs or to es-
tablish minimal standards can involve
regulatory options, criminal enforce-
ment, rules of liability under existing tort
law mechanisms, direct assessment or
taxation, or other strategies. See Robert
C. Fellmeth, A Theory of Regulation: A
Platform for State Regulatory Reform,
5:2 CAL. REG. L. REP. (Spring 1989) at
3.
82. The American model of the mar-
ketplace rests on fundamental prerequi-
sites, including two relevant to the Un-
fair Competition Act: a sufficient number
of competitors independently acting and
pricing to provide "effective competi-
tion," and accurate information about the
respective characteristics of competing
products available to consumers choos-
ing between them. The maintenance of
these two prerequisites helps to assure
the "consumer sovereignty" goal of the
marketplace.
83. Barquis v. Merchants Collection
Ass'n of Oakland, Inc., 7 Cal. 3d 94
(1972).
84. The district attorneys of San Diego
and Los Angeles counties, and the city
attorneys of both cities, have been par-
ticularly active in civil use of section
17200.
85. A plaintiff serving as a "class rep-
resentative" in a traditional class action
has a fiduciary obligations to the class
(as does counsel), and certification as
one able to "adequately represent" ab-
sent class members is required, as is no-
tice to absent class members to allow
them the opportunity to "opt out" and
pursue their own remedies as they see
fit. An Unfair Competition Act settle-
ment which lacks those safeguards may
not constitutionally bar others who might
seek relief for the same wrong; one can-
not secretly litigate away the rights of
another. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (af-
firming minimal required due process to
bind an absent plaintiff, including pri-
marily the rights of notice, opportunity
to opt out, and "adequate representa-
tion").
86. See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d
25 (1977).
87. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
17204.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id. at § 17203. In other words,
any one of the possible plaintiffs listed
above can file for prospective injunctive
relief, to appoint a receiver, or for any
equitable order necessary to provide res-
titution to all those who may have been
overcharged (or otherwise lost money)
from unfair competition.
90. Note that in many consumer class
actions at law, the measure of damages
is equivalent to restitution in equity.
Where the gravamen of the complaint is
an overcharge, the two concepts may be
equivalent.
91. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, supra note 85, 472 U.S. at 812.
92. See Consumers Lobby Against
Monopolies v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
25 Cal. 3d 891 (1979), for discussion of
the alternative bases for private attorney
general or common fund recompense for
attorneys; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1021.5, which sets forth the require-
ments for private attorney general rec-
ompense for counsel whose client pre-
vails in an action and vindicates a right
substantially beyond the direct financial
interest of his client. Note that the statute
allows a "multiplier" to be applied to fair
market value billing based on the risk of
the case, skill of counsel, and other fac-
tors. See Serrano v. Priest, supra note 86,
20 Cal. 3d at 49. Note that most section
1021.5 awards have been assessed against
public agencies; however, the statute does
not distinguish between types of defen-
dants and private defendants are vulner-
able to fee assessment. See, e.g., Con-
sumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Alta-Dena
Certified Dairy, 4 Cal. App. 4th 963, 977
(1992).
93. For a leading example of fluid re-
covery, see Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67
Cal. 2d 695 (1967); for a leading exam-
ple of cy pres relief, see State of Cali-
fornia v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d
460 (1986).
94. Theoretically, the receipt of a ben-
efit by a victim would appear to estop that
person from seeking duplicative relief from
the same defendant for the same alleged
wrong particularly where the court sits in
equity. However, in the context of fluid re-
covery or cy pres relief, there is no advance
notice to the victim nor any opportunity to
opt out, and he or she may not individually
receive an actual benefit. Hence, res judi-
cata foreclosing access to the courts raises
understandable due process concerns. See
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d
119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967).
95. See People v. Pacific Land Re-
search, 20 Cal. 3d 10 (1977). Note that
the decision itself does not recite the un-
derlying facts; this author participated in
the argument in this case.
96. Following an eighteen-month in-
vestigation, a complaint and stipulated
settlement in People v. Cox Cable Com-
munications, Inc., No. 679554 (San Diego
County Superior Court), were filed by the
San Diego County District Attorney's Of-
fice (joined by the Attorney General) on
August 5, 1994. In July 1994, plaintiff
Vincent Ross, represented by four sepa-
rate law firms, filed Ross v. Cox Cable
Communications, Inc., No. 678526. In
his opposition to Cox's later motion for
judgment on the pleadings, Ross cited
People v. Pacific Land Research, supra
note 95, for the proposition that the pub-
lic civil action by public prosecutors
served a separate law enforcement func-
tion from a private civil action, and leapt
to the non sequitur that both could pro-
ceed and claim full (i.e., double) restitu-
tion against the same defendants for the
same wrong. The question in Pacific
Land Research concerned whether a trial
court could be compelled to consolidate
a private and public civil action into the
same case. Many private actions involve
other causes of action sounding at law
and involving use of a jury. The public
civil action is in equity with only a court
hearing it, and with many of the private
defenses unavailable. Pacific Land Re-
search gives the trial court discretion to
keep the two proceedings separate, dis-
tinguishable from whether a court sitting
in equity should entertain duplicative
restitution awards to the same benefici-
aries from the same defendant for the
same alleged wrongs. Nevertheless, pri-
vate plaintiffs are correct that there is no
established way to ascertain who is rep-
resenting who for what, who is bound
by what, and how members of "the gen-
eral public" receive notice or otherwise
know that someone has filed for relief to
benefit them.
14 California Regulatory Law Reporter • VoL 15, No. 1 (Winter 1995)
FEATURE ARTICLE
97. Note that a similar scenario re-
cently occurred in the San Francisco Bay
Area regarding the alleged mislabelling
of meat by Safeway and Lucky Stores.
Public prosecutors sued both grocery
stores under section 17200 and both
stores settled. Lucky paid $4 million in
civil penalties, costs, and restitution;
Safeway paid over $6 million. Thereaf-
ter, private counsel brought class actions
against both stores on the same and re-
lated grounds, but there-unlike the San
Diego case-the superior court sustained
defendants' demurrers. Alexandra v. Lucky
Stores, No. 727750 (Alameda County Su-
perior Court), was dismissed in May 1994
and is not being appealed, and Gray v.
Safeway, No. H171057 (Alameda County
Superior Court), was dismissed on a mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings in
August 1994; Gray is currently pending
appeal, No. A067323, in the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal. Additionally, a
class of Muslims sued Lucky on January
27, 1995 in Rahmany, et al. v. Lucky
Stores, No. C95-00453 (Contra Costa
County Superior Court), for-among
other things--emotional stress damages,
on grounds that meat labelled as ground
beef actually contained pork, which is
strictly forbidden in the Muslim religion.
At this writing, Rahmany is pending in
superior court.
Note that these public prosecutor reso-
lutions underscore the appropriateness of
public hearings and examination of "resti-
tution" which collaterally estops all others.
For example, in the Safeway case, $2 mil-
lion in civil penalties and $350,000 in costs
are split between Alameda County's bud-
get (its district attorney filed the case,
along with the Attorney General) and the
state's general fund. The recovery of
$350,000 in costs if the case were litigated
is dubious-they would more likely be
below $50,000. Of the $2 million in resti-
tution, $1,250,000 is guaranteed to be al-
located to the Consumer Protection Prose-
cution Trust Fund-a fund to be used by
prosecutors to investigate similar cases.
Further, the remaining $750,000 consists
of grants to be awarded by court applica-
tion through the Alameda County District
Attorney and the Attorney General to en-
hance "empirical tests for the effective in-
vestigation and prosecution of multi-spe-
cies adulteration cases...." The defendant is
also required to donate $1 million worth
of food (at wholesale value) to nonprofit
food banks for the poor in nine northern
California counties.
While allocating restitution as above
described may be justified as the most
effective cy pres alternative, over 80%
of the cash and other consideration will
go to public treasuries and for public
agency funding or assistance. Such an al-
location should not be approved in a way
barring others where the sole decision-
makers are the defendant and the public
agencies involved.
98. Preisendorfer v. Cox Cable Com-
munications, Inc., No. 678198 (San
Diego County Superior Court), filed No-
vember 8, 1994; compare with Ross v.
Cox Cable Communications, Inc., supra
note 96. These two cases remain pending
at this writing, and cover the same alle-
gations of the complaint filed by the dis-
trict attorney and Attorney General in
People v. Cox Cable Communications,
Inc., supra note 96. Note that this author
has been retained to consult for the Of-
fice of District Attorney in the investiga-
tion of the cable industry in San Diego
County with regard to possible restraint
of trade and consumer law violations.
99. "SLAPP" is an acronym for
"Strategic Litigation Against Public Par-
ticipation."
100. See Rubin v. Green, 4 Cal. 4th
1187 (1993). The court here acknowl-
edged the scope of the Unfair Competi-
tion Act, and the standing of defendants
to counterclaim under it. However, the
narrow holding of the case precluded this
particular section 17200 cause of action
because it involved alleged solicitation
by plaintiff's counsel, which is categor-
ically subject to the so-called "litigation
privilege" under Civil Code section 47(b).
However, three justices opined that in-
junctive relief did lie through section
17200. Moreover, the factual setting of
the case indicates the collateral use of
statutes for leverage purposes by both
plaintiffs and defendants. For a candid
description of the opportunities section
17200 may avail the defense side, see
William L. Stern, With Some Help from
17200, the Empire Can Strike Back, L.A.
DAILY J., July 29, 1992.
101. See, e.g., Bronco Wine Co. v.
Frank A. Logoluso Farms 214 Cal. App.
3d 699, 715-21 (1989) (judgments in ac-
tions brought on behalf of the general
public are not binding as to absent class
members). But see Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. v. Superior Court (Abascal),
211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 773 (1989) (sec-
tion 17200 case on behalf of "the general
public" may proceed without class certi-
fication and may grant "restitution in
favor of absent persons").
102. If there is res judicata effect
based solely on the "first judgment filed"
resolving a section 17200 cause of ac-
tion, the defendant is in a position to bar-
gain with alternative public and private
plaintiffs to reduce restitution or injunc-
tive terms. For example, where one pub-
lic and two private litigants have filed
suits under section 17200, the defendant
could approach one of the private liti-
gants, offer substantial fees to counsel
and token restitution, and perhaps file a
stipulated final judgment. Courts under-
standably tend to sign judgments pro-
ffered to them by apparently adverse par-
ties.
103. Proposition 65, the Safe Drink-
ing Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of
1986, provides precedent for this pro-
posal. Proposition 65 added section
25249.7 to the Health and Safety Code;
section 25249.7(d) allows "any person"
to commence a Proposition 65 enforce-
ment action so long as the person pro-
vides 60 days' notice to the Attorney
General, the district attorney and city at-
torney in whose jurisdiction the violation
is alleged to have occurred, and the al-
leged violator, and "neither the Attorney
General nor any district attorney nor any
city attorney or prosecutor has com-
menced and is diligently prosecuting an
action against such violation."
104. See especially Committee to De-
fend Reproductive Rights v. A Free Preg-
nancy Center, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1991).
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